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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines two localization strategies that Chinese Multinational 
Corporations (MNCs) use to improve the likelihood of success in penetrating 
developed markets: internally- and externally-oriented strategies. Internal strategies 
include those that give subsidiary managers greater discretion to fit their human 
resource (HR) practices to local norms. External strategies include networking 
strategies with external stakeholders designed to access local information and develop 
relationships of trust that facilitate doing business in new environments. Drawing on a 
sample of Chinese MNCs operating in the U.S., I show that both localization strategies 
provide important means to overcome liabilities of foreignness and origin and 
contribute to subsidiary growth. The extent of adoption of these strategies, however, 
reflects not only strategic considerations, but also institutional pressures from host and 
home countries. Host country regulatory pressures appear to induce network building, 
but home country institutions (the relative level of state ownership) are associated with 
lower devolution of HRM and network building to subsidiary managers, suggesting 
efforts to exert centralized control.
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Introduction 
Emerging market Multinational Corporations (MNCs) have recently 
accelerated their expansion into global markets. The outward foreign direct investment 
(FDI) from developing regions such as Asia, Africa, and Latin America amounted to 
over $445 billion in 2014, which was approximately 34% of total world FDI 
(UNCTAD, 2015). China, the largest developing country in the world, has taken the 
lead in a new round of global expansion. An increasing number of Chinese MNCs are 
penetrating foreign markets by acquiring existing assets, establishing foreign 
subsidiaries, and forming cross-border strategic alliances. 
The expansion of Chinese MNCs is not limited to emerging markets, but also 
extends to developed countries in Europe and North America (Child & Marinova, 
2014). FDI from China to the U.S. has increased more than two-fold from $3.3 billion 
in 2010 to over $9.8 billion in 2014 (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2015). The returns 
on investment of Chinese MNCs in developed nations, however, often fall short of 
expectations. Air China, for example, raised major controversies in the U.K. for 
publishing brochures that encourage visitors to stay away from areas populated by 
ethnic minorities. The U.S. government banned Huawei and ZTE, the top two Chinese 
telecommunications equipment manufacturers, from acquiring U.S. companies and 
selling products to government agencies for security reasons. 
As latecomers to global competition, Chinese MNCs suffer not only from 
liabilities of foreignness – that is, the higher cost of doing business as a foreign 
enterprise (Zaheer, 1995), but also liabilities of origin -- disadvantages and stereotypes 
associated with the country of origin (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 2000). In order to overcome 
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these liabilities, Chinese MNCs adopt localization strategies, which refer to proactive 
actions to adapt to a particular environment that includes specific customer demands, 
constraints in product and service distribution, unique business cultures, and 
governmental regulations (Roth & Morrison, 1991). In this study, I distinguish 
between two types of localization strategies: internally-oriented strategies that alter 
organizational structures and practices to fit local norms and externally-oriented 
strategies designed to gain support from local stakeholders and access to local 
markets. 
Despite the acknowledged importance of both internal and external approaches 
(e.g. Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2002; Law, Song, Wong, & Chen, 2009), the state 
of scholarly knowledge about how MNCs select among these strategies remains scant. 
Researchers have long held the assumption that the use of localization strategies has 
positive effects on subsidiary performance. Empirical evidence supporting such a 
positive relationship, however, is rather limited. Better knowledge regarding the 
effectiveness of internal and external localization strategies can enhance our 
understanding of how MNCs survive in unfamiliar environments.  
In addition to strategic considerations, it is also necessary to understand how 
MNCs combine internal and external localization strategies as a response to 
heterogeneous and even conflicting external influence. While researchers have 
recognized the impact of both host and home country institutional pressures, most 
empirical studies have focused only on host country influence (Estrin, Meyer, Nielsen, 
& Nielsen, 2016). Chinese MNCs are unique in their strong connections with home 
country institutions. The Chinese government can exert considerable influence over 
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MNCs via direct company ownership. In order to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of how Chinese MNCs choose their localization strategies, researchers 
should simultaneously take into account both the host and home country influence. 
The primary objective of this study is to address these issues. Following 
suggestions of some recent International Business (IB) studies, I focus on foreign 
subsidiaries as the focal unit of analysis (Chan & Makino, 2007; Hillamn & Wan, 
2005). I shed light on two specific localization strategies: devolution of HRM decision 
making, which represents an internal mechanism, and network building, which 
represents an external mechanism. A first goal of this study is to investigate whether 
these strategies are effective in mitigating the dual liabilities of foreignness and origin, 
as measured by subsidiary growth -- which is the most important goal that Chinese 
MNCs pursue at the initial stage of entry.  
Second, drawing on the institutional theory, I explore whether institutional 
pressures shape the extent of adoption of localization strategies. The hypotheses 
recognize the opposing institutional logics that host and home countries impose on 
Chinese MNCs. While host country institutional actors expect Chinese MNCs to 
display good intentions to adapt their organizational practices to host country norms, 
pressures from the home country government may constrain firms’ ability to adopt 
localization strategies. I test these hypotheses using survey data from subsidiaries of 
82 Chinese MNCs in the U.S. 
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, I 
compare the effectiveness of two localization mechanisms in promoting subsidiary 
growth, as well as the particular institutional forces that determine the adoption of 
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these mechanisms. Second, I extend the international business research by examining 
how the conflicting logics of host and home country institutions shape decisions of 
MNC subsidiaries. Chinese MNCs, especially those with state ownership, experience 
what I call “dual institutional liabilities”: they encounter strong institutional pressures 
from the host country, but lack sufficient flexibility to adjust their managerial 
practices. Third, I focus on a subject of study – Chinese MNCs in developed markets – 
that has received little attention, even though their presence in developed economies 
has grown considerably in the last decade. While the existing literature primarily 
targets MNCs from developed regions (Mathews, 2006), this study provides important 
empirical evidence regarding how and why Chinese MNCs adopt localization 
strategies. 
 
Localization Strategies and Subsidiary Growth 
Liabilities of Foreignness and Liabilities of Origin 
When entering a developed market, Chinese MNCs encounter hazards and 
uncertainties that are related to the status of “foreignness” as well as status of origin as 
“Chinese firms”. “Foreignness” induces extra costs of investing, operating, and 
managing in the host country, which local firms do not experience (Zaheer, 1995). 
Chinese MNCs are particularly vulnerable to these liabilities, as they suffer from a 
lack of resources to compete in the global market, especially with respect to brand 
recognition and proprietary technologies (Buckley et al. 2007). One senior manager 
from a company that provides network security solutions described liabilities of 
foreignness in this way, 
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A major obstacle that we encounter in the U.S. is a lack of strong brand. We have 
been very successful in China helping our business partners maintain their online 
systems. But we find it extremely difficult to convince American firms to try our 
services. Local managers told us that they would not take the risk of trusting a 
company that they have never heard of, and they may consider our services only if 
we are able to establish a strong standing in the country (Interview 1, 2015).1 
While liabilities of foreignness are common obstacles among MNCs, liabilities 
of origin are unique to MNCs from emerging market economies. In a developed 
market, host country actors may discriminate against Chinese MNCs based on the fact 
that they come from a “less-developed” country. In particular, the identity of “Chinese 
firms” is often associated with negative stereotypes such as low standards of corporate 
governance, inferior product quality, and unfair competition (Globerman & Shapiro, 
2009). The rapid expansion of Chinese MNCs in developed markets also raises public 
concerns regarding proprietary rights protection and national security, especially when 
the expansion involves intensive interference from the home country government 
(Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, & Peng, 2013). As one manager from a large state-
owned telecommunication company suggests: 
The largest obstacle to expand is strict regulatory supervision from the U.S. 
government. Team Telecom, the executive branch agencies that scrutinize national 
security and law enforcement aspects of Federal Communication Commission 
(FCC), denied our first application to the FCC section 214 authorization (an 
                                                     
1 This quotation and others below come from interviews with informants of foreign subsidiaries. More 
information about these interviews is in the research method section and Table 2 in the appendix. 
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operational license in the telecommunication industry) for the sake of national 
security. But overall the standards are neither clear nor transparent. They provide no 
clear guidelines about what creates a “threat” to the national security (Interview 2, 
2015).  
These liabilities make it particularly difficult for Chinese MNCs to establish 
and expand operations in developed countries. By helping firms adapt to local 
conditions, localization strategies provide an important means to overcome both 
liabilities of foreignness and origin (Klossek, Linke, & Nippa, 2012). 
 
Internal and External Localization Strategies 
This study classifies localization strategies into two types according to their 
locus of application — internally- and externally-oriented strategies. I list the major 
characteristics of these two strategies in Table 1. Internal strategies change 
organizational structures or managerial practices to develop location-specific 
capabilities that tackle changes in market conditions in the host country, adapt to 
customer preferences and local norms (Morris & Snell, 2011; Prahalad & Doz, 1981), 
and gain legitimacy by improving reliability and credibility in corporate governance 
(Luo and Tung, 2007). Replacing expatriate managers with local managers and 
allowing foreign subsidiaries considerable discretion in decision making are two of the 
most common internal strategies. Subsidiaries can substitute expatriate managers with 
competent local managers who have tacit knowledge to manage the subsidiary 
according to local norms and regulations (Law et al. 2009; Law, Wong, & Wang, 
2004). They can also take initiatives to implement HR practices that fit local norms 
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and comply with labor and employment laws (Bjorkman, Fey & Park, 2007; Ferner, 
Almond, & Colling, 2005). In addition to HR practices, subsidiaries can adjust their 
operational processes and marketing strategies to accommodate needs of local 
customers. 
---------------------------------------------- 
-- Table 1 goes about here -- 
---------------------------------------------- 
The external strategies, which target external stakeholders and generate 
support from the local community, provide another pathway to achieve local 
responsiveness. These strategies acquire critical resources and knowledge from local 
stakeholders and at the same time strengthen trust with local community actors by 
enhancing mutual understanding and increasing legitimacy as perceived by host 
country stakeholders (Luo, 2001). MNCs can build up strong local network 
connections to heighten their adaptation to local norms (Ge & Wang, 2013; Luo, 
Shenkar, & Nyaw, 2002), or promote their recognition and social legitimacy by 
actively engaging in corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives (Gardberg & 
Fombrun, 2006). Managers may also adopt political strategies such as lobbying, 
advocacy advertising, and political donations to reduce environmental uncertainties 
and gain access to critical resources (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). 
Despite potential benefits, these two mechanisms may also carry certain 
challenges and risks. Change in internal organizational structures and practices may 
threaten the control of parent firms over foreign subsidiaries (Birkinshaw, 1998; Fan, 
Zhang, & Zhu, 2013) and reduce the efficiency of internal collaboration (Mudambi, 
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1999). Subunits can build up their own slack resources and pursue strategic goals that 
may not coincide with broader corporate objectives (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989). Strong 
external relationships, by contrast, imply commitment and obligations to local 
stakeholders (Burt, 1997). Foreign subsidiaries need to fulfill local responsibilities 
such as complying with labor standards and using local suppliers. These obligations 
may restrict freedom of decision making.  In addition, firms need to invest substantial 
resources and effort to maintain network connections and support their engagement in, 
for example, corporate social responsibility programs (Adler & Kwon, 2002). The 
heavy investment may distract these firms’ attention from other critical business 
functions and undermine their capacity to carry out these work tasks. 
In terms of public salience, external strategies have higher exposure than 
internal strategies. Many firms may deliberately make their network connections or 
corporate social responsibility involvement explicit in order to gain legitimacy from 
their connections to high-prestige local institutions such as business associations, 
leading firms, or universities (Kuilman & Li, 2009). In doing so, firms convey a 
message that they are willing to establish long-term relationships with the local 
community (Campbell, Eden, & Miller, 2012). By contrast, internal strategies 
primarily target employees and have a relatively low public exposure. 
In this study, I focus on two specific localization strategies: devolution of 
HRM decision making to subsidiary managers (used interchangeably with devolution 
of HRM in the following sections) and network building. Devolution of HRM—the 
responsibility of foreign subsidiary managers for making decisions on HRM policy-
related issues, including recruitment and selection, training and development, 
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performance appraisal, compensation, and labor relations (Gooderham, Morley, Parry, 
& Stavrou, 2015)—represents an internally-oriented strategy to achieve local 
responsiveness. Network building—the proactive efforts to build up connections with 
local government, business associations, firms, universities, and local community—is 
an externally-oriented strategy that concentrates on interaction of focal firm and the 
external environment. 
 
Localization Strategies and Growth of Foreign Subsidiaries 
As the expansion of Chinese MNCs in developed markets is still at an early 
stage, their primary objective is to achieve growth in terms of market share, business 
activities, and enterprise size. The two localization strategies, devolution of HRM and 
network building, promote growth of foreign subsidiaries. From a resource-based 
perspective, the managerial capabilities that an organization holds enable and 
constrain its growth (Penrose, 1959). In a multinational context, researchers assess 
managerial capabilities as the extent to which foreign subsidiaries are able to adapt to 
local norms, explore business opportunities, and address changes in market conditions 
in a specific host country (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Tan, 2009). Devolution of HRM 
facilitates on-going learning from the external environment (Kang, Morris, & Snell, 
2014; Minbaeva et al. 2003). Managers can develop learning-promoting HR practices 
to help subsidiaries develop and strengthen their managerial capabilities to adapt to 
local norms and address specific customer preferences and thus achieve substantial 
organizational growth.  
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One HR manager from a non-state-owned bank emphasizes the importance of 
HRM devolution in promoting managerial capabilities. The U.S. branch has 100% 
control over HR issues. It recruits a majority of employees from the local community. 
The traditionally defined “expatriates” do not exist in the bank. The branch treats 
people who move from Chinese headquarters as local employees, working 
permanently in the U.S. rather than taking short-term assignments. It hires local 
consultants to help establish a compensation system that aligns pay with both 
individual and organizational performance. The U.S. branch also encourages 
employees to take courses in local universities and invite professional institutions to 
provide training opportunities, with the expectation that employees can learn local 
business norms and acquire useful skills through these trainings. These HR practices 
help the U.S. branch attract and retain qualified human capital and quickly adapt to an 
unfamiliar and distinct market (Interview 3, 2015). 
In addition to managerial capabilities, devolution of HRM also enhances the 
reliability and credibility of foreign subsidiaries. External stakeholders often criticize 
the governance structure of Chinese MNCs for its lack of professionalism and 
credibility (Buckley et al. 2007). Applying this kind of managerial structure to a 
foreign market may prevent Chinese MNCs from gaining legitimacy. Opposition to 
Chinese MNCs is most intense and mobile in developed nations, where open and 
transparent political systems are well established (Child & Marinova, 2014). 
Devolution of HRM enables foreign subsidiaries to establish modern governance 
structures that are in line with requirements of host country stakeholders and thus 
improve their trustworthiness and reliability (Luo & Tung, 2007). These new 
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managerial practices distance the foreign subsidiaries from their parent firms (Wang, 
Luo, Lu, Sun, & Maksimov, 2013). As the social identity of “firms from China” 
becomes less salient, foreign subsidiaries are subject to weaker oppositions from the 
local community. 
H1a: Devolution of HRM is positively related to growth of foreign subsidiaries in 
the host country. 
Network building promotes subsidiary growth by providing access to tacit 
knowledge about local business opportunities and social norms. First, Chinese MNCs 
can cultivate their network relationships with local firms, governmental authorities, 
and other critical stakeholders in the local community to acquire valuable information 
regarding business opportunities (Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000; Zhou, Wu, & Luo, 
2007). When seeking to acquire a certain plant, for example, Chinese MNCs with 
strong external network relationships can gain more comprehensive information about 
the target asset and thus avoid bidding higher price than the actual worthiness (Hope, 
Thomas, Vyas, 2011). Second, by establishing network relationships with local 
stakeholders, foreign subsidiaries develop a better understanding of the local 
idiosyncrasies, including social norms, customer preferences, and legal requirements. 
With resource endowments from external networks, foreign subsidiaries improve their 
capabilities to manage business operations and deal with local demands. 
Network building also facilitates trust with local stakeholders. When entering a 
developed market, Chinese MNCs often lack sufficient knowledge about legitimacy 
requirements of the specific institutional environment. Meanwhile, local stakeholders 
have very limited information to evaluate whether business actions of these firms are 
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appropriate (Globerman & Shapiro, 2009). The information asymmetry restricts 
Chinese MNCs from gaining legitimacy and negotiating exemption of compliance 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Network building reduces the information asymmetry 
between the two parties. To the extent that Chinese MNCs can regularly interact and 
consult with host country political and economic actors, they are able to convey their 
goodwill of doing business and mitigate negative stereotypes regarding accountability, 
transparency, and trustworthiness (Ge & Wang, 2003; Zhou, Wu, & Luo, 2007). When 
foreign subsidiaries establish trust relationships with local stakeholders, they can avoid 
interference from external parties and seek growth opportunities in foreign markets 
(Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002).  
One manager who works for a bank with a long history of presence in the U.S. 
explain how they benefit from strong community relationships. Managers of the bank 
are on the board of a few important local business associations. They also establish 
long-term relationships with some local universities and colleges. Although the bank 
has moved its new offices to Manhattan, it still maintains operations in Queens, where 
a lot of its old customers locate. In doing so, the bank tries to convey a message that it 
is highly committed to serving customers and the society as a whole. With strong 
community relationships, the bank is successful in not only retaining existing loyal 
customers, but also attracting new ones each year (Interview 4, 2015). 
H1b: Network building is positively related to growth of foreign subsidiaries in 
the host country. 
While this study emphasizes the importance of devolution of HRM and 
network building for promoting subsidiary growth, little theory or research has 
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informed the question of whether one strategy is more important or effective than the 
other.  Therefore, in addition to the two hypotheses, I explore the question of the 
relative impact of the two localization strategies on subsidiary growth. 
 
Institutional Pressures from the Host and Home Country 
Researchers of international business have used institutional theory to explain 
why foreign subsidiaries of MNCs adopt certain practices or strategies (e.g. Husted, 
Montiel, & Christmann, 2016). Firms must conform to rules and belief systems 
prevailing in the external environment (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). They adopt strategies and practices not simply for efficiency reasons, but also 
as responses to isomorphic and legitimacy pressures (Scott, 1995). As MNCs operate 
simultaneously in multiple institutional environments, they must cope with 
contradictory institutional prescriptions and gain legitimacy from different external 
constituents (Greenwood et al. 2011; Xu & Shenkar, 2002). The ability to navigate 
institutional complexity has become a key to the success or failure of MNCs 
(Ahmadjian, 2016). In the following section, I describe the institutional logics that 
host and home country institutions hold and explain how these opposing logics shape 
strategies of foreign subsidiaries.  
 
Host Country Regulatory Pressures 
Regulatory pressures from the host country include formal laws, regulations, 
and rules that promote certain types of behaviors and restrict others (Scott, 1995). The 
level of regulatory pressure may vary across foreign firms, depending on the extent to 
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which these firms can provide local benefits as well as whether they pose threats to 
national interests (Rui & Yip, 2008). Chinese MNCs, for example, are subject to 
different degrees of regulatory scrutiny based on host-country concerns regarding 
issues as whether the particular MNC subsidiary is more likely to gain access to 
intellectual property or sensitive national security information (Gooderman, Morley, 
Parry, & Parry; Meyer, Ding, Li, & Zhang, 2014).  
To address regulatory pressures from the host country, Chinese MNCs must 
conform to local regulations and demonstrate goodwill in doing business (Li & Meyer, 
2009). If foreign subsidiaries have substantial managerial discretion, they are able to 
adjust their HR practices based on regulatory requirements (Fenton-O’Creevy et al. 
2008). Subsidiary managers, for example, can hire large numbers of local citizens, 
provide training about compliance, and adapt industrial relations practices to fit local 
regulations and social norms (Cuervo-Cazurra et al. 2014). Devolution of HRM also 
empowers foreign subsidiaries to learn from local firms and implement advanced 
managerial practices in developed countries. These managerial practices improve the 
corporate governance and transparency of foreign subsidiaries and thus develop 
subsidiaries’ own independent reputation and legitimacy in the host country (Wang et 
al. 2013). Through isolation from the negative image of parent firms, Chinese MNC 
subsidiaries may eliminate misgivings found among government officials and citizens 
regarding poor management quality. 
In addition to devolution of HRM, Chinese MNCs that encounter intense 
regulatory pressures are also likely to respond by investigating substantially in 
network building. They seek relationships of trust with regulators and the broad 
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community to increase mutual understanding and thus mitigate negative stereotypes 
(Globerman & Shapiro, 2009). According to one public relations manager of a New 
York based state-owned bank, community relationships are important means through 
which Chinese MNCs achieve legitimacy in developed markets. Despite a short 
history in the U.S. market, the bank has already established strong business 
partnerships with many local firms. It also maintains good relationships with local 
governors, participates in a few influential business and industry associations, and 
actively gets involved in social responsibility programs. Two years ago, the bank 
successfully acquired a local U.S. bank with operations in major metropolitan areas. It 
is one of the first successful Chinese acquisition in the U.S. banking industry. The 
network relationships certainly help in completing the deal (Interview 5, 2015). 
H2a: Host country regulatory pressure is positively related to devolution of HRM 
decision making and adoption of network building 
Foreign subsidiaries facing intense host country regulatory pressures are more 
likely to adopt network building than devolution of HRM. That is because they are 
particularly vulnerable to regulatory pressures when they first enter a developed 
market – for example, they lack relationships of trust or local information.  Network 
building provides an immediate and effective means to address these pressures. 
Through network relationships, Chinese MNCs can acquire useful knowledge about 
local norms and regulations and therefore develop timely responses to the external 
influence. Network building also attracts more external exposure than devolution of 
HRM. The positive effect of HRM devolution, by contrast, takes a longer time to 
realize. Devolution of HRM promotes location-specific capabilities to adapt to local 
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environments, but only through a long and continuous learning process. Similarly, 
legitimacy benefits of HRM devolution also manifest in a long period of time. Given 
the relatively low public exposure of internal localization efforts, local stakeholders 
may not be aware of internal changes in Chinese MNCs.  
H2b: Host country regulatory pressure has a stronger positive relationship with 
network building than with devolution of HRM. 
 
Pressures from the Home Country Government 
Since prior research has primarily targeted MNCs from developed regions 
where state intervention is very limited, the effect of governing institutions in the 
home country has been largely neglected (Henisz & Zelner, 2005). The expansion of 
Chinese MNCs, however, has led to more attention to the impact of the home country 
government. In addition to the host country influence, a foreign subsidiary is also 
subject to pressures from the home country government (Wang, Hong, Kafouros, & 
Wright, 2012). A most direct way through which the home country government 
influence Chinese MNCs is to hold shares in these firms. State ownership establishes 
direct control over MNCs and thereby increases the resource dependence of these 
firms (Cui & Jiang, 2012). Governing institutions influence state-owned MNCs and 
align the expansion activities with their own interests (Choudhury & Khanna, 2014). 
State ownership hinders devolution of HRM decision making, as this 
localization strategy threatens the control of the home country government over 
foreign subsidiaries. The Chinese government mandated state-owned firms to fulfill 
political responsibilities such as imposing wage caps to reduce income disparity, 
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hiring and training the unemployed, and implementing employee-friendly practices to 
achieve harmonious employment relationships (Cooke, 2012). Foreign subsidiaries, as 
extensions of state-owned firms, need to assume similar political responsibilities and 
serve as role models of personnel practices for other private MNCs. In order to meet 
these political priorities, state-owned MNCs must implement consistent HR practices 
in both domestic operations and foreign subsidiaries. By changing HR practices to 
accommodate local demands, devolution of HRM generates heterogeneity within 
MNCs and threatens the control over foreign affiliates.  
Below I summarize the perspective of one manager from a state-owned energy 
firm regarding the pressures that the U.S. subsidiary experience in deciding their HR 
practices. The global headquarters request all subunits, foreign- or domestic-based, to 
adopt a set of standardized HR practices. There is a fixed number of employees that 
the subsidiary can hire each year. Managers have to file applications if the subsidiary 
needs more employees to sustain its operation. Similarly, managers must go through 
formal procedures to get the approval from the global headquarters every time they 
make promotion and transfer decisions, even though the possibility of rejection is 
rather low. When there is a conflict between existing HR practices and local business 
demands, the subsidiary submits a report to higher-level managers in Beijing to 
propose changes in these practices. Overall, the manager concludes that it is global 
headquarters that has the final say in HR-related issues (Interview 6, 2015). 
State ownership also constrains network building because local obligations 
associated with this strategy may contradict interests of the home country government. 
Strong network relationships require heavy commitment to the connected partners 
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(Luo, Shenkar, & Nyaw, 2002). In order to strengthen and maintain these local 
connections, Chinese MNCs must fulfill obligations such as hiring local workers, 
enhancing transparency of corporate governance, and adopting higher standards of 
corporate social responsibilities. These responsibilities, however, may not be aligned 
with, or even contradict interests of the home country government. In addition, the 
heavy investment on establishing and maintaining network connections reduce 
resources available to accomplish political and economic missions of the home 
country government. 
H3a: The proportion of state ownership is negatively related to the adoption of 
HRM devolution and the adoption of network building. 
Devolution of HRM, compared to network building, is subject to stronger 
restrictions from the home country government. Through ongoing reforms of 
decentralization and liberalization, governing institutions in China have greatly 
reduced their involvement in business operations of state-owned firms, keeping power 
over only a few key strategic decisions (Musacchio, Lazzarini, & Aguilera, 2015). 
Personnel management is among one of these key decisions (Xu, Zhu, & Lin, 2002). 
As labor decisions affect the capability of the state to regulate resource allocation, it 
has become a primary channel through which the home country government exerts its 
control (O’Connor, Deng, & Luo, 2006). Devolution of HRM is likely to bring about 
substantial changes in HR practices, which may possibly attenuate the influence of 
government over foreign operations. Network building, as an externally-oriented 
localization strategy, does not generate a direct threat to the control of the Chinese 
government. 
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H3b: State ownership has a stronger negative relationship with devolution of 
HRM than with network building. 
 
Research Methods 
Sample and Procedures 
I investigated localization strategies of Chinese MNCs in the U.S. and chose to 
limit the sample of subsidiaries to one host country for three reasons. First, this allows 
me to control for political risk and other country-level differences that provide 
alternative explanations to the issues I am studying. Second, as one of the world’s 
leading economies, the U.S. provides an appropriate context to explore Chinese MNCs 
in developed markets. Third, given difficulties of collecting first-hand survey data 
from Chinese MNCs (Deng, 2013), I focus on one location with the highest data 
availability. 
I collaborated with the China General Chamber of Commerce – U.S. (CGCC) 
to design and distribute surveys at the subsidiary level of Chinese MNCs. CGCC is a 
quasi-governmental agency that promotes Chinese investment and protects interests of 
Chinese firms in the U.S. It represented over 1,000 Chinese MNCs with operations in 
U.S. at the time of survey. Staff at the CGCC were responsible for contacting Chinese 
subsidiaries and coordinating the distribution and collection of surveys. A cover letter 
explained major purposes of the research and provided contact information of the 
researcher. High-level managers (e.g. CEO or general managers) completed the survey 
online.  
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In 2014, the CGCC conducted a preliminary survey to develop a 
comprehensive understanding of its member companies. They collected data from 101 
foreign subsidiaries of Chinese MNCs, 44 of which also participated in the 2015 
research. I revised the initial questionnaire in 2014 based on researchers’ suggestions 
and feedback from companies. In order to ensure the quality of data analysis, I used 
the 2014 survey to cross-check responses in the 2015 survey and did a supplementary 
analysis based on the 44 overlapping cases. 
Of 200 surveys CGCC distributed in 2015, 121 completed surveys returned for 
a response rate of 60 percent. After teasing out cases with missing values, I had 82 
observations left for data analysis. I cross-checked survey responses (e.g. state 
ownership, year of entry, etc.) with the 2014 survey as well as external sources such as 
annual reports and official websites. Then I corrected inconsistent responses and filled 
in missing values. I compared the major organizational characteristics of cases with 
and without missing values and found no significant differences in all of these 
characteristics, except for state ownership and size of parent firm. Cases with missing 
values are more likely to come from smaller businesses and have lower state shares 
than those without. 
The Chinese government held more than 50% of shares in 56% of the 82 
companies in the sample. A majority of foreign subsidiaries (73 out of 82) were 
wholly owned by the parent firm. The sample industry breakdown was 12 from 
energy-related industries, 13 from financial and banking, and 21 from manufacturing. 
The average year of entry into the U.S. market was 12, with 50 percent of companies 
having entered in the last seven years. 
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Interviews 
I supplemented the survey data analysis with 20 interviews of senior managers, 
HR managers and specialists, operational managers, public relations managers, and 
other informants in foreign subsidiaries of Chinese MNCs. I selected 15 different 
companies based on three major characteristics — industry, ownership status, and 
entry mode. The firms selected are from six different industries (manufacturing, high 
technology, banking, telecommunication, energy, and transportation). Seven of these 
firms have central or local Chinese government as the controlling shareholder, four of 
them have less than 50% of state shares, and the other four are private businesses. 
Three of these firms entered the U.S. market via mergers & acquisitions, whereas the 
other 12 chose greenfield investment. Interviews were semi-structured and lasted 
about two hours. Respondents describe the history of expansion of their subsidiary in 
the U.S. market, the HR practices that they adopt, their network relationships in the 
local community, and institutional pressures they experience from the host and home 
country. These interviews helped me develop a richer picture of strategies of Chinese 
MNCs in the U.S. and strengthen my understanding of the hypothesized relationships. 
Measures 
Dependent variables. Similar to previous studies, I used subjective measures to 
assess growth (Lu, Zhou, Bruton, & Li, 2010). While not ideal, the perceptual measure 
is appropriate for this study because many foreign subsidiaries of Chinese MNCs are 
not able to provide reliable financial indices at their early stage of entry into the U.S. 
market (Woodcock, Beamish, & Makino, 1994). I used three five-point likert-scale 
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items to capture perceptions regarding growth in 2014: growth of number of 
employees, growth of market share, and growth of business activities (1 = decrease 
dramatically, 5 = increase a lot). The alpha reliability is .69, which is very close to the 
recommended .70 criterion (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). 
Devolution of HRM decision making. Similar to Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2008) 
and Ferner et al. (2013), I measured devolution of HRM as the degree of centralized 
control over HR practices experienced by the subsidiary. Respondents reported 
managerial discretion in deciding HR practices for three employee groups: high-level 
managers, middle-level managers, and non-managerial employees. They rated foreign 
subsidiary discretion in deciding policies for recruitment, training and development, 
performance appraisal, compensation, and employment relations for each of the three 
groups (1 = totally decided by parent firm, 4 = totally decided by foreign subsidiary). I 
gained an overall score by taking the average of HR devolution ratings of these three 
employee groups (alpha = .77).  
Network building. The measure of network building is based upon previous 
research (Ge & Wang, 2013; Luo, 2001; Yiu, Lau, & Bruton, 2007). I evaluated 
network building as the frequency of interactions with local stakeholders. Respondents 
reported “how frequently does your firm interact with the following institutions or 
individuals”. The targets of network interaction included officials of government, 
business associations, local companies, universities, and the local community. I 
measured the intensity of network relationships on a frequency score from 1 to 4 for 
each of item (1 = very rarely, 4 = once a week). The alpha reliability is .87.  
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State ownership. Following the convention of prior studies, I measured state 
ownership by the proportion of shares owned by the Chinese government (either the 
central or local government entity) (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Musacchio & Lazzarini, 
2012). Respondents reported the percent of shares that the Chinese government owns 
in the parent firm, based on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 = wholly state owned; 2 = state owns 
more than 50%; 3 = state owns 10% to 50%; 4 = state owns less than 10%; 5 = totally 
private). I converted the 5-point scale into a continuous variable that measures 
percentage of state ownership (1 = 100%, 2 = 75%, 3 = 30%, 4 = 5%, and 5 = 0). Then 
I reversed coded the variable so that negative coefficients mean that proportion of state 
ownership has a negative effect on localization strategies. 
Regulatory pressures from U.S. institutions. I measured host country pressures 
by asking respondents to rate “whether the U.S. government targets foreign 
companies” in areas of monopoly detection, propriety rights protection, tax, finance, 
corruption, and others. Based on these items, I created an additive index of regulatory 
pressures, with the total score ranging from 0 to 6.  
Control variables. I measured the extent to which foreign expansion is based 
on asset seeking or market expansion as researchers did in prior studies (Cui, Meyer, 
& Hu, 2014). Respondents reported “the extent to which they evaluate the following 
items as primary motivators to enter the U.S. market” (1 = not important at all, 5 = 
very important). I used three items to measure each construct. Items of asset seeking 
include acquiring advanced technology, acquiring international management expertise, 
and acquiring an international brand. The three items of market expansion are 
expanding global market, reducing cost of trade, and overcoming trade barriers. I also 
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controlled for industry, with a series of dummy variables equal to 1 for financial 
services and 1 for energy, else 0. I clustered the remaining industries into one category 
because the expansion of MNCs from these industries often does not raise public 
concerns regarding national interests and security. These firms are subject to less 
intense regulatory pressures than those from finance and energy industry. I controlled 
for the number of Years since entry into the U.S. market because firms with more 
experience in a particular country are likely to adopt local managerial practices and 
have stronger network relationships with local stakeholders. These experienced firms 
also report lower growth rates than new entries. I subtracted the year that the company 
first entered the U.S. from 2015 and then took the natural log. I controlled for size of 
parent firm because large parent firms have more experience adapting their managerial 
practices to fit local norms and regulations. They also provide greater resources for 
foreign subsidiaries to establish external relationships. I measured size of parent firm 
by taking the natural log of the total number of employees in the parent firm. Number 
of countries in which the company has operations measured a company’s prior 
experience with internationalization (taking natural log). Ownership structure 
measured whether the Chinese parent firm fully owns the foreign subsidiary. Foreign 
subsidiaries with shares held by multiple companies may be subject to less influence 
from their parent firm. They have greater discretion in deciding their HR practices and 
establish local networks.  
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Results 
Table 3 presents means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations for the 
variables. The test of Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) indicate that multicollinearity is 
not likely to be a problem in this study. The highest VIF is 4.16, which is much below 
the common cutoff of 10, and the mean of all VIFs is not considerably larger than 1 
(Chatterjee & Price, 1991). Table 4 reports results of regression analyses for 
devolution of HRM, network building, and growth of foreign subsidiaries. I first ran 
OLS regressions for devolution of HRM and network building. Then I examined the 
extent to which localization strategies were related to growth of foreign subsidiaries in 
the context of host and home country pressures. To test hypotheses 2c and 3c, I 
followed procedures suggested by Clogg, Petkova, & Haritou (1995) to compare 
regression coefficients across models. 𝑏1 is the coefficient of the host/home country 
influence in Model 1, and 𝑏2 is the regression coefficient of the host/home country 
influence in Model 3. Given the small sample size, it is reasonable to relax the level of 
significance to .10. 
t =
𝑏1 − 𝑏2
√𝑠(𝑏1)2 + 𝑠(𝑏2)2
 
With respect to the host country influence, hypotheses 2a predicts that 
subsidiaries that face stronger regulatory pressures in the host country are more likely 
to adopt HRM devolution and network building. The coefficient on regulatory 
pressure is positive and significant for network building (Model 4, b = .16, p < .05). 
The relationship between regulatory pressure and devolution of HRM is negative, but 
not significant at conventional levels (Model 2, b = -.05, p > .10). Overall, hypothesis 
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2a receives only partial support. Hypothesis 2b proposes a stronger relationship of host 
regulatory pressures with network building than with devolution of HRM. The 
comparison of coefficients between Model 2 and Model 4 substantiates this hypothesis 
(t = 2.44, p < .01). 
---------------------------------------------- 
-- Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here -- 
---------------------------------------------- 
Hypotheses 3a posits that subsidiaries with a higher proportion of state 
ownership are less likely to adopt HRM devolution and network building than private 
businesses. Results indicate a marginally significant relationship between proportion 
of state ownership and devolution of HRM (Model 2, b = -.07, p = .09).  The 
relationship between proportion of state ownership and network building is significant 
and negative (Model 4, b = -.15, p < .05). Results provide support for hypothesis 3a. 
Hypothesis 3c, which proposes a stronger relationship of proportion of state ownership 
with devolution of HRM rather than with network building, does not receive empirical 
support (t = 1.11, p > .10). 
The findings for control variables are also worth noting. Subsidiaries that 
pursue a strategic goal of market expansion are likely to report greater devolution of 
HRM (Model 2, b = .17, p < .05), while those with a strategic goal of asset seeking are 
more actively engaging in network building (Model 4, b = .15, p = .06). Subsidiaries 
that operate in energy-related industries are less likely to adopt HRM devolution than 
those operate in other industries (Model 2, b = -.45, p < .05). Due to its importance to 
national security and economic development, the energy industry is subject to the 
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greatest supervision from the home country government. The need to maintain control 
and consistency outweigh the necessity to address regulatory pressures in the host 
country. Wholly-owned subsidiaries, compared to those owned by multiple parties, 
report less adoption of network building (Model 4, b = -.63, p < .05).  
Model 5 and Model 6 present results of regression analyses for subsidiary 
growth. Hypothesis 1 predicts that subsidiaries with high level of HRM devolution are 
more likely to seek growth opportunities. The coefficient on devolution of HRM is 
positive and significant (Model 6, b = .39, p < .01), providing statistical support for 
hypothesis 1a. Hypothesis 1b, which proposes a positive relationship between 
subsidiary growth and network building, receive strong empirical support (Model 6, b 
= .24, p < .05). Adding localization strategies to the base model explains an extra 7% 
of total variance. With respect to control variables, years since entry is negatively 
related to growth of foreign subsidiaries (Model 6, b = -.36, p < .01), as expected. The 
rate of growth decreases as firms stay longer in the host country because the marginal 
gain of learning drops over time (Evans, 1987). New entrants are likely to benefit 
more from acquiring knowledge in the host country than those with a longer history. 
The negative relationship is consistent with findings in previous studies (e.g. 
Jovanovic, 1982).  
In addition to the hypotheses, this study also examined the relative impact of 
localization strategies on subsidiary growth. Standardized regression coefficients 
allow researchers to compare the relative importance of different variables. I 
calculated standardized coefficients of HRM devolution and network building using a 
“beta” order in STATA software. An increase of one standard deviation in devolution 
28 
 
of HRM leads to a .34 unit of standard deviation increase in subsidiary growth. An 
increase of one standard deviation in network building yields a .27 standard deviation 
increase in subsidiary growth. Results indicate a somewhat stronger relationship of 
subsidiary growth to devolution of HRM. 
 
Supplementary Analysis 
To ensure validity of the findings, I employed alternative measures to assess 
the proportion of state ownership and regulatory pressures. Based on the same survey 
item used above, I used two other common approaches to assess state ownership. First, 
I coded firms as “state-owned” (1, else 0) if the Chinese government is the controlling 
shareholder, namely the one that owns more than 50% of total shares in the company 
(Inoue, Lazzarini, & Musacchio, 2010; Meyer, Ding, Li, & Zhang, 2014). Second, I 
coded state ownership depending on whether the subsidiary affiliates of firms had at 
least some state shares (Cui & Jiang, 2010; Duanmu, 2012). I gave a score of 0 if the 
subsidiary was entirely private, and 1 if otherwise. Results remained unchanged when 
I used these alternative measures. 
For host country regulatory pressures, I used an alternative measure that 
assesses whether subsidiaries encounter risks and problems in the following areas: 
detrimental policies against foreign companies, limitations on labor use, strong 
governmental monitoring, visa and immigration policies, national protectionism, and 
difficulty to acquire licenses for operating in a certain industry or producing a certain 
type of products. I added up all these items to create an overall index, with a score 
ranging from 0 to 6. Consistent with my findings, regulatory pressures are positively 
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related to network building, but at a lower significance level than in the original 
specification. Using this operationalization, there was no significant relationship 
between regulatory pressures and devolution of HRM.  
The cross-sectional design and single source of respondents may bias results of 
this analysis and limit causal inferences. In order to address these concerns, I 
performed several regression analyses based on the 44 overlapping cases in both the 
2014 and 2015 surveys. I assessed state ownership, primary industry of operation, 
years since entry, and ownership structure in exactly the same way as in the original 
analysis. The measure of HRM devolution and host country regulatory pressures, 
however, are somewhat different in the two surveys. Respondents reported an overall 
score to evaluate “the extent to which foreign subsidiaries can decide their HR 
practices”, rather than providing ratings for each specific HR practice and separately 
for three different employee groups. I evaluated regulatory pressures using the 
alternative measure in the supplementary analysis. Data on network building, size of 
parent firm, number of global operations, and strategic objectives was only available 
in the 2015 survey.  
I first regressed devolution of HRM and network building (from the 2015 
survey) on variables collected from the 2014 survey. Then I performed a regression 
analysis with the dependent variable (subsidiary growth) collected in 2015, and the 
independent variable (devolution of HRM) in 2014. I found consistent results for the 
relationship between host and home country pressures and the adoption of localization 
strategies. Similar to my findings, there is a positive relationship between devolution 
of HRM and subsidiary growth, but at a lower significance level than in the original 
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specification. In general, supplementary analyses provide further support for my 
primary findings. 
 
Discussion 
The primary objective of this study was to examine the performance outcomes 
and determinants of internal and external localization strategies. First, both devolution 
of HRM, an internally-oriented strategy, and network building, an externally-oriented 
strategy, are positively related to subsidiary growth. The effect of HRM devolution is 
stronger than that of network building. Second, host and home country institutions 
impose conflicting logics over Chinese MNCs. Host country regulatory pressures are 
positively related to network building, whereas the home country influence is 
negatively related to devolution of HRM and network building.  
This study offers several contributions. First, I advance the localization 
literature by providing empirical evidence to support the effectiveness of localization 
strategies. Both internal and external strategies are positively related subsidiary 
growth. My findings indicate that the relative impact of HRM devolution is stronger 
than that of network building. A possible explanation is that managerial capabilities, 
which help subsidiaries address customer demands and adapt to local norms, are most 
important in sustaining growth at an early stage of expansion. Chinese MNCs can 
develop these capabilities by adopting HR practices that facilitate on-going learning 
from the external environment. Through network relationships, subsidiaries can 
acquire valuable knowledge about business opportunities and local norms. 
Nevertheless, subsidiaries can fully utilize the knowledge only when they have 
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appropriate capabilities in place. In addition, the two localization strategies may also 
differ in their effectiveness in achieving legitimacy. Subsidiaries may gain external 
legitimacy by promoting trust with the local community. The strategy of network 
building along, however, is not sufficient for trust building. Subsidiaries need to also 
improve the reliability and credibility of their internal practices in order to acquire 
support from local stakeholders.  
As an addition to previous research that stresses the importance of individual 
localization strategies in penetrating foreign markets (e.g. Law et al. 2009; Ge & 
Wang, 2013), this study examines how foreign subsidiaries combine multiple 
strategies. My findings indicate two major factors that affect the selection of Chinese 
MNCs over internal and external localization strategies — strategic considerations and 
environmental pressures. My findings show that subsidiaries with different strategic 
objectives are likely to adopt different localization strategies. Firms devolve HRM 
decision making to fulfill their strategic objective of market expansion. In order to 
gain recognition from local customers, managers adapt their HR practices to not only 
address customer demands, but also differentiate foreign subsidiaries from their parent 
company in China (Child & Marinova, 2014). Quotes from a public relations manager 
who works at a computer manufacturing company suggest how the devolution of 
HRM may help market expansion. 
Due to our origin from China, customers are sometimes skeptical of the product 
quality as well as our ability to deliver good services. We try to build up confidence 
from customers by making ourselves a highly localized company. We use 
Americanized operational procedures and strictly follow industry standards. We also 
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hire a large local workforce, promote local employees to become managers, and 
provide above-average compensation packages to attract talents (Interview 7, 2015). 
Subsidiaries establish strong local connections to achieve the strategic 
objective of asset seeking. Through information exchange, subsidiaries can identify 
better acquisition opportunities and develop accurate estimates of asset values 
(Buckley, Elia, & Kafouros, 2014). Local connections also strengthen legitimacy of 
Chinese MNCs and thus reduce potential barriers and oppositions (Klossek et al. 
2012). In addition to strategic considerations, subsidiaries also adopt localization 
strategies as a response to institutional pressures from both the host and home country.  
Second, this study extends the international business literature by describing 
the institutional complexity that foreign subsidiaries face. While the existing literature 
primarily focuses on the host country influence, I simultaneously incorporate host and 
home country institutions in researching localization strategies. I examine the 
aggregate impact of the dual institutional forces and reveal the distinct logics that host 
and home country institutions hold over localization decisions of Chinese MNCs. My 
findings indicate that host country regulatory pressures have stronger effect on 
network building than on devolution of HRM. Foreign subsidiaries adopt network 
building, a relatively effective and immediate approach, to deal with regulatory 
pressures. Devolution of HRM, which is long-term oriented and low in public 
salience, is not a first choice in coping with regulatory pressures. With respect to the 
home country influence, the restrictions from the Chinese government apply equally to 
the devolution of HRM and network building. 
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My findings also reveal the “dual institutional liabilities” that state-owned 
MNCs experience when expanding into developed markets. The regulatory pressures 
from the host country can escalate when firms have strong resource dependence upon 
the home country government. The stronger the regulatory pressures in the host 
country, the more flexibility that state-owned MNCs need. The influence from the 
home country government, however, restrict firms from adopting localization 
strategies to accommodate these local demands. There is very limited room for state-
owned MNCs to negotiate institutional freedom in decision making (Li, Cui, & Lu, 
2014). In spite of strong regulatory pressures in the host country, the home country 
government is not likely to compromise its control over foreign operations.  
Third, my study of Chinese MNCs contributes to an emerging body of research 
that focuses on foreign direct investment from emerging market countries. Although 
the presence of emerging market MNCs has grown considerably in developed 
economies, empirical evidence regarding how these firms penetrate into developed 
markets and achieve growth has been rather limited (Miller, Thomas, Eden, & Hitt, 
2008; Musteen, Datta, & Francis, 2014). A primary focus of the existing literature is 
on how emerging market MNCs select their entry modes and ownership structures 
(e.g. Rui & Yip, 2008; Cui & Jiang, 2010), while little attention has been directed 
towards strategies that firms adopt after entry. My findings indicate that emerging 
market MNCs are actively adapting to local environment by using localization 
strategies. By examining how and why emerging market MNCs adopt localization 
strategies, this study contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the 
internationalization process of emerging market MNCs (Deng, 2012). 
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I also reveal a unique characteristic of emerging market MNCs—strong 
influence from the home country government. The control of the home country 
government is likely to affect the choices of localization strategies. Emerging market 
MNCs, especially those that are dependent on government support, need to adopt 
strategies that are in line with political objectives of the home country government and 
abandon those that are against its interests. With control and consistency as priority 
concerns, the emerging market government maintains strong control over foreign 
subsidiaries. This study addresses a recent call for more attention on the role that the 
home country government plays in the global expansion of emerging market MNCs 
(Cui & Jiang, 2012).  
This paper should also be viewed in light of its limitations. First, findings of 
this study should be interpreted with some caution, as the research was based on a 
sample of MNCs from a single country – and China, with its powerful central 
government, may be a unique or at least extreme case. A large number of Chinese 
MNCs remain in state hands, even though they are directed to place more emphasis on 
economic objectives. These firms are possibly subject to greater pressures to align 
their business activities with political priorities. Some recent studies, however, suggest 
commonalities of state influence among emerging market MNCs. Choudhury & 
Khanna (2014) found strong influence of Indian government over firms in the 
“strategic sector” even after the privatization movement. Comparisons of emerging 
market MNCs from countries with diverse levels of state control and influence will be 
of particular value. Researchers should also explore other unique characteristics of 
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emerging market MNCs and examine how their mechanisms of internationalization 
differ from MNCs from developed regions.  
Second, selection bias may exist because of the source of the sample, which 
comes from membership in the CGCC, a quasi-governmental agency that is affiliated 
with the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. It is possible that these member firms are 
larger in size and have stronger government connections than non-members. These 
firms may also report lower levels of local embeddedness. To avoid the label of 
“Chinese companies”, some firms (such as Lenovo) may choose not to join this 
association. Due to a lack of data, I am not able to compare characteristics of sampled 
firms with those of non-member firms. Despite these potential problems, this firm-
level dataset provides valuable opportunities to explore the penetration of Chinese 
MNCs in developed markets. Future research should include a larger and more diverse 
sample of firms. 
Third, due to the single source of data, this research may suffer from common 
method bias. Following suggestions of Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff 
(2003), I used multiple strategies to mitigate the potential bias. First of all, I 
guaranteed confidentiality, used clear response guidelines, located measures of 
independent variables and dependent variables in different parts of the questionnaire, 
and assessed these variables by different scales. Some measures (such as state 
ownership) describe objective characteristics of the subsidiary and thus are not likely 
to share common method variance with other variables. Next, I used Harman’s one-
factor test and found that the single factor model demonstrated a poor fit to the data. 
The test showed that common method bias is not a major threat to hypothesis testing. 
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Furthermore, I did a supplementary analysis and ran regressions in which independent 
variables were from the 2014 survey, and dependent variables from the 2015 survey. 
In general, results of the supplementary analysis substantiated my primary findings. 
Overall, although common method bias cannot be completely ruled out, these 
procedures can help mitigate the threat to validity. 
In conclusion, this study examines localization strategies that Chinese MNCs 
adopt when entering developed markets. Devolution of HRM, an internally-oriented 
strategy, and network building, an externally-oriented strategy, provide important 
means for Chinese MNCs to overcome liabilities of foreignness and liabilities of 
origin. The adoption of these strategies reflects not only strategic objectives, but also 
concerns regarding regulatory pressures from the host country, as well as influence of 
the home country government. My investigation is one of the few studies that examine 
the internationalization process of emerging market MNCs in developed markets, and 
I hope that my findings will motivate others to further pursue this line of research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
References 
 
Adler, P. S., & Kwon, S. W. (2002). Social capital: Prospects for a new concept. 
Academy of management review, 27(1), 17-40. 
Ahmadjian, C. L. (2016). Comparative institutional analysis and institutional 
complexity. Journal of Management Studies, 53(1), 12-27. 
Andersson, U., Forsgren, M., & Holm, U. (2002). The strategic impact of external 
networks: subsidiary performance and competence development in the 
multinational corporation. Strategic management journal, 23(11), 979-996. 
Bartlett, C., and Ghoshal, S. (1989). Managing across Borders: The Transnational 
Solution. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
Bartlett, C. A. and Ghoshal, S. (2000). Going global: lessons from late movers. 
Harvard Business Review, 78, 132–42. 
Birkinshaw, J. (1998). Corporate entrepreneurship in network organizations:: How 
subsidiary initiative drives internal market efficiency. European Management 
Journal, 16(3), 355-364. 
Birkinshaw, J., & Hood, N. (1998). Multinational subsidiary evolution: Capability and 
charter change in foreign-owned subsidiary companies. Academy of Management 
Review, 23(4), 773-795. 
Björkman, I., Fey, C. F., & Park, H. J. (2007). Institutional theory and MNC 
subsidiary HRM practices: Evidence from a three-country study. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 38(3), 430-446. 
38 
 
Buckley, P. J., Clegg, L. J., Cross, A. R., Liu, X., Voss, H., & Zheng, P. (2007). The 
determinants of Chinese outward foreign direct investment. Journal of 
international business studies, 38(4), 499-518. 
Buckley, P. J., Elia, S., & Kafouros, M. (2014). Acquisitions by emerging market 
multinationals: Implications for firm performance. Journal of World Business, 
49(4), 611-632. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (2015). China - International Trade and Investment 
Country Facts. Retrieved from 
http://www.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.cfm?Area=650. 
Burt, R. S. (1997). The contingent value of social capital. Administrative science 
quarterly, 42(2), 339-365. 
Campbell, J. T., Eden, L., & Miller, S. R. (2012). Multinationals and corporate social 
responsibility in host countries: Does distance matter?. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 43(1), 84-106. 
Chan, C. M., & Makino, S. (2007). Legitimacy and multi-level institutional 
environments: Implications for foreign subsidiary ownership structure. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 38(4), 621-638. 
Chatterjee, S., & Price, B. (1991). Regression analysis by example (2nd ed.). New 
York: Wiley. 
Chen, T. J., Chen, H., & Ku, Y. H. (2004). Foreign direct investment and local 
linkages. Journal of International Business Studies, 35(4), 320-333. 
Child, J., & Marinova, S. (2014). The role of context in the globalization of Chinese 
firms. Management and Organization Review, 10(3), 347–371. 
39 
 
Choudhury, P., & Khanna, T. (2014). Toward resource independence-Why state-
owned entities become multinationals: An empirical study of India's public R&D 
laboratories. Journal of International Business Studies, 45(8), 943-960. 
Clogg, C. C., Petkova, E., & Haritou, A. (1995). Statistical methods for comparing 
regression coefficients between models. American Journal of Sociology, 1261-
1293. 
Cooke, F. L. (2012). The globalization of Chinese telecom corporations: Strategy, 
challenges and HR implications for the MNCs and host countries. The 
International Journal of Human Resource Management, 23(9), 1832-1852. 
Cui, L., & Jiang, F. (2010). Behind ownership decision of Chinese outward FDI: 
Resources and institutions. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 27(4), 751-774. 
Cui, L., & Jiang, F. (2012). State ownership effect on firms' FDI ownership decisions 
under institutional pressure: a study of Chinese outward-investing firms. Journal 
of International Business Studies, 43(3), 264-284. 
Cui, L., Meyer, K. E., & Hu, H. W. (2014). What drives firms’ intent to seek strategic 
assets by foreign direct investment? A study of emerging economy firms. Journal 
of World Business, 49(4), 488-501. 
Cuervo-Cazurra, A., Inkpen, A., Musacchio, A., & Ramaswamy, K. (2014). 
Governments as owners: State-owned multinational companies. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 45(8), 919-942. 
Deng, P. (2012). The internationalization of Chinese firms: A critical review and 
future research. International Journal of Management Reviews, 14(4), 408-427. 
40 
 
Deng, P. (2013). Chinese Outward Direct Investment Research: Theoretical 
Integration and Recommendations. Management and Organization Review, 9(3), 
513-539. 
DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional 
isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American 
Sociological Review, 48: 147-160. 
Duanmu, J. L. (2012). Firm heterogeneity and location choice of Chinese 
multinational enterprises (MNEs). Journal of World Business, 47(1), 64-72. 
Estrin, S., Meyer, K. E., Nielsen, B. B., & Nielsen, S. (2016). Home country 
institutions and the internationalization of state owned enterprises: A cross-
country analysis. Journal of World Business, 51(2), 294-307. 
Evans, D. S. (1987). The relationship between firm growth, size, and age: Estimates 
for 100 manufacturing industries. The journal of industrial economics, 567-581. 
Fan, D., Zhang, M. M., & Zhu, C. J. (2013). International human resource 
management strategies of Chinese multinationals operating abroad. Asia Pacific 
Business Review, 19(4), 526-541. 
Fenton-O'Creevy, M., Gooderham, P., & Nordhaug, O. (2008). Human resource 
management in US subsidiaries in Europe and Australia: centralisation or 
autonomy?. Journal of International Business Studies, 39(1), 151-166. 
Ferner, A., Almond, P., & Colling, T. (2005). Institutional theory and the cross-
national transfer of employment policy: The case of ‘workforce diversity’ in US 
multinationals. Journal of International Business Studies, 36(3), 304-321. 
41 
 
Ferner, A., Bélanger, J., Tregaskis, O., Morley, M., & Quintanilla, J. (2013). US 
multinationals and the control of subsidiary employment policies. Industrial & 
Labor Relations Review, 66(3), 645-669. 
Gardberg, N. A., & Fombrun, C. J. (2006). Corporate citizenship: Creating intangible 
assets across institutional environments. Academy of management Review, 31(2), 
329-346. 
Ge, G. L., & Wang, H. Q. (2013). The impact of network relationships on 
internationalization process: An empirical study of Chinese private enterprises. 
Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 30(4), 1169-1189. 
Globerman, S., & Shapiro, D. (2009). Economic and strategic considerations 
surrounding Chinese FDI in the United States. Asia Pacific Journal of 
Management, 26(1), 163-183. 
Gooderham, P. N., Morley, M. J., Parry, E., & Stavrou, E. (2015). National and firm-
level drivers of the devolution of HRM decision making to line managers. Journal 
of International Business Studies, 46(6), 715-723. 
Greenwood, R., Raynard, M., Kodeih, F., Micelotta, E. R., & Lounsbury, M. (2011). 
Institutional complexity and organizational responses. The Academy of 
Management Annals, 5(1), 317-371. 
Gulati, R., Nohria, N., & Zaheer, A. (2000). Guest editors’ introduction to the special 
issue: strategic networks. Strategic Management Journal, 21(3), 199-201. 
Hair, J. F., Anderson, R. E., Tatham, R. L., & Black, W. C. 1998. Multivariate data 
analysis. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
42 
 
Henisz, W. J., & Zelner, B. A. (2005). Legitimacy, interest group pressures, and 
change in emergent institutions: The case of foreign investors and host country 
governments. Academy of Management Review, 30(2), 361-382. 
Hillman, A. J., & Hitt, M. A. (1999). Corporate political strategy formulation: A 
model of approach, participation, and strategy decisions. Academy of management 
review, 24(4), 825-842. 
Hillman, A. J., & Wan, W. P. (2005). The determinants of MNE subsidiaries' political 
strategies: evidence of institutional duality. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 36(3), 322-340. 
Hope, O. K., Thomas, W., & Vyas, D. (2011). The cost of pride: why do firms from 
developing countries bid higher? Journal of International Business Studies, 42(1), 
128-151. 
Hoskisson, R. E., Wright, M., Filatotchev, I., & Peng, M. W. (2013). Emerging 
multinationals from Mid‐Range economies: The influence of institutions and 
factor markets. Journal of Management Studies, 50(7), 1295-1321. 
Husted, B. W., Montiel, I., & Christmann, P. (2016). Effects of local legitimacy on 
certification decisions to global and national CSR standards by multinational 
subsidiaries and domestic firms. Journal of International Business Studies, 47(3), 
382-397. 
Inoue, C. F., Lazzarini, S. G., & Musacchio, A. (2013). Leviathan as a minority 
shareholder: Firm-level implications of state equity purchases. Academy of 
Management Journal, 56(6), 1775-1801. 
43 
 
Jovanovic, B. (1982). Selection and the Evolution of Industry. Econometrica: Journal 
of the Econometric Society, 649-670. 
Kang, S. C., Morris, S. S., & Snell, S. A. (2007). Relational archetypes, organizational 
learning, and value creation: Extending the human resource architecture. Academy 
of Management Review, 32(1), 236-256. 
Klossek, A., Linke, B. M., & Nippa, M. (2012). Chinese enterprises in Germany: 
Establishment modes and strategies to mitigate the liability of foreignness. 
Journal of World Business, 47(1), 35-44. 
Kostova, T., & Zaheer, S. (1999). Organizational legitimacy under conditions of 
complexity: The case of the multinational enterprise. Academy of Management 
review, 24(1), 64-81. 
Kuilman, J. G., & Li, J. (2009). Grades of membership and legitimacy spillovers: 
Foreign banks in Shanghai, 1847–1935. Academy of Management Journal, 52(2), 
229-245. 
Law, K. S., Song, L. J., Wong, C. S., & Chen, D. (2009). The antecedents and 
consequences of successful localization. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 40(8), 1359-1373. 
Law, K. S., Wong, C. S., & Wang, K. D. (2004). An empirical test of the model on 
managing the localization of human resources in the People's Republic of China. 
The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 15(4-5), 635-648. 
Li, M. H., Cui, L., & Lu, J. (2014). Varieties in state capitalism: Outward FDI 
strategies of central and local state-owned enterprises from emerging economy 
countries. Journal of International Business Studies, 45(8), 980-1004. 
44 
 
Li, P. Y., & Meyer, K. E. (2009). Contextualizing experience effects in international 
business: A study of ownership strategies. Journal of World Business, 44(4), 370-
382. 
Lu, Y., Zhou, L., Bruton, G., & Li, W. (2010). Capabilities as a mediator linking 
resources and the international performance of entrepreneurial firms in an 
emerging economy. Journal of International Business Studies, 41(3), 419-436. 
Luo, Y. (2001). Determinants of local responsiveness: Perspectives from foreign 
subsidiaries in an emerging market. Journal of Management, 27(4), 451-477. 
Luo, Y., Shenkar, O., & Nyaw, M. K. (2002). Mitigating liabilities of foreignness: 
Defensive versus offensive approaches. Journal of International Management, 
8(3), 283-300. 
Luo, Y., & Tung, R. L. (2007). International expansion of emerging market 
enterprises: A springboard perspective. Journal of international business studies, 
38(4), 481-498. 
Mathews, J. A. (2006). Dragon multinationals: New players in 21st century 
globalization. Asia Pacific journal of management, 23(1), 5-27. 
Meyer, K. E., Ding, Y., Li, J., & Zhang, H. (2014). Overcoming distrust: How state-
owned enterprises adapt their foreign entries to institutional pressures abroad. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 45(8), 1005-1028. 
Meyer, A,, & Rowan, B, 1977, Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as 
myth and ceremony, American Journal of Sociology, 83: 340—363. 
45 
 
Minbaeva, D., Pedersen, T., Björkman, I., Fey, C. F., & Park, H. J. (2003). MNC 
knowledge transfer, subsidiary absorptive capacity, and HRM. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 34(6), 586-599. 
Morris, S. S., & Snell, S. A. (2011). Intellectual capital configurations and 
organizational capability: An empirical examination of human resource subunits 
in the multinational enterprise. Journal of International Business Studies, 805-
827. 
Mudambi, R. (1999). MNE internal capital markets and subsidiary strategic 
independence. International Business Review, 8(2), 197-211. 
Musacchio, A., Lazzarini, S. G., & Aguilera, R. V. (2015). New varieties of state 
capitalism: Strategic and governance implications. The Academy of Management 
Perspectives, 29(1), 115-131. 
O’Connor, N. G., Deng, J., & Luo, Y. (2006). Political constraints, organization 
design and performance measurement in China’s state-owned enterprises. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 31(2), 157-177. 
Penrose, E. T. (1959). The theory of the growth of the firm. New York: Oxford 
University Press 
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J. Y., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2003). Common 
method biases in behavioral research: a critical review of the literature and 
recommended remedies. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(5), 879. 
Prahalad, C. K., & Doz, Y. L. (1981). An approach to strategic control in MNCs. 
Sloan Management Review, 22(4), 5. 
46 
 
Roth, K., & Morrison, A. J. (1991). An empirical analysis of the integration-
responsiveness framework in global industries. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 21 (4), 541–564. 
Rui, H., & Yip, G. S. (2008). Foreign acquisitions by Chinese firms: A strategic intent 
perspective. Journal of World Business, 43(2), 213-226. 
Scott, R. 1995. Institutions and organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Tan, D. (2009). Foreign market entry strategies and post-entry growth: Acquisitions vs 
greenfield investments. Journal of International Business Studies, 40(6), 1046-
1063. 
Thite, M., Wilkinson, A., & Shah, D. (2012). Internationalization and HRM strategies 
across subsidiaries in multinational corporations from emerging economies—A 
conceptual framework. Journal of World Business, 47(2), 251-258. 
UNCTAD. (2014). World investment report 2014. Geneva: United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development. 
Wang, C., Hong, J., Kafouros, M., & Wright, M. (2012). Exploring the role of 
government involvement in outward FDI from emerging economies. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 43(7), 655-676. 
Wang, S. L., Luo, Y., Lu, X., Sun, J., & Maksimov, V. (2013). Autonomy delegation 
to foreign subsidiaries: An enabling mechanism for emerging-market 
multinationals. Journal of International Business Studies, 45(2), 111-130. 
Xu, D., & Shenkar, O. (2002). Note: Institutional distance and the multinational 
enterprise. Academy of Management review, 27(4), 608-618. 
47 
 
Xu, L. C., Zhu, T., & Lin, Y. M., (2002). Political control, agency problems and 
ownership reform: evidence from China. Working Paper. Washington, D.C. 
World Bank. 
Yiu, D. W., Lau, C., & Bruton, G. D. (2007). International venturing by emerging 
economy firms: The effects of firm capabilities, home country networks, and 
corporate entrepreneurship. Journal of International Business Studies, 38(4), 519-
540. 
Zaheer, S. (1995), Overcoming the Liability of Foreignness. Academy of Management 
Journal, 38, 341–363. 
Zhang, M., & Edwards, C. (2007). Diffusing ‘best practice’ in Chinese multinationals: 
The motivation, facilitation and limitations. The International Journal of Human 
Resource Management, 18(12), 2147-2165. 
Zhou, L., Wu, W. P., & Luo, X. (2007). Internationalization and the performance of 
born-global SMEs: the mediating role of social networks. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 673-690. 
Zimmerman, M. A., & Zeitz, G. J. (2002). Beyond survival: Achieving new venture 
growth by building legitimacy. Academy of Management Review, 27(3), 414. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
Appendix 1 
 
Table 1: Internal and External Localization Strategies 
 
 
Internal localization 
strategies 
External localization 
strategies 
Mechanisms to 
reduce liabilities 
Develop location-specific 
capabilities; enhance 
credibility and reliability 
Acquire external resources 
and knowledge; build up 
trust with local community 
Salience to the 
public 
Low public exposure High public exposure 
Change in 
organizational 
structure 
Change No change 
Potential costs 
Loss of control by parent 
over foreign subsidiary; low 
efficiency; misalignment of 
headquarter and subunit 
objectives 
Restrictions of decision 
making; high costs of 
maintenance 
Example 
Replacement of expatriate 
managers with locals; 
devolution of HR practices; 
Change in operational 
processes and marketing 
strategies 
Community network 
building; participation in 
corporate social 
responsibility programs; 
lobbying and contributing to 
politicians 
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Appendix 2 
 
Table 2: Information about Interviews 
 
Interview 
Number 
Industry 
Ownership 
structure 
Entry mode Company 
Position of 
interviewee 
1 
Information and 
technology 
Private business Greenfield 
Company A: a provider of 
network security solutions 
Director of the 
U.S. subsidiary 
2 Telecommunication 
Higher than 50% 
of state shares 
Greenfield 
Company B: a large 
telecommunication operator 
Manager of the 
strategy planning 
department 
3 Banking 
Lower than 50% 
of state shares 
Greenfield 
Company C: a bank that is 
based in New York City 
HR manager 
4 Banking 
Higher than 50% 
of state shares 
Greenfield 
Company D: a bank that has 
four branches in the U.S. 
Manager of the 
strategy planning 
department 
5 Banking 
Higher than 50% 
of state shares 
Mergers & 
Acquisitions 
Company E: a bank that just 
acquired a local bank in the 
U.S. 
Public relations 
manager 
6 Energy 
Higher than 50% 
of state shares 
Greenfield 
Company F: a company that 
focus on trading of petroleum 
HR manager 
7 
Manufacturing/ 
information and 
technology 
Lower than 50% 
of state shares 
Mergers & 
Acquisitions 
Company G: a large 
computer manufacturer 
Public relations 
manager 
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Appendix 3 
 
Table 3: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of Variables 
 
 Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 1 Growth 3.43 .82        
 2 Internal: Devolution of HRM 2.80 .69 0.29*       
 3 External: Network building 1.99 .90 0.20 -0.01      
 4 Energy industry .15 .36 -0.24* -0.30** 0.02     
 5 Financial industry .16 .37 0.076 -0.16 0.05 -0.09    
 6 Year of entry into USa 2.17 .90 -0.41** -0.03 0.03 0.21 -0.07   
 7 Size of the parent firma 8.96 2.09 0.06 -0.03 0.19 0.11 0.15 0.08  
 8 Number of foreign operationsa 1.66 .74 -0.07 -0.24* 0.02 0.29** 0.19 0.31** 0.43** 
 9 Ownership structure .89 .31 -0.17 -0.15 -0.25* 0.15 -0.06 0.01 -0.08 
10 Asset seeking strategy 1.72 1.38 0.01 0.18 0.26* 0.07 -0.18 -0.14 0.19 
11 Market expansion strategy 1.86 1.05 0.08 0.33** 0.13 -0.01 -0.23* -0.02 0.14 
12 Host: Regulatory pressures 1.16 1.37 0.07 -0.17 0.21 0.08 0.05 -0.07 0.01 
13 Home: State ownership 53.84 43.76 -0.13 -0.32** -0.16 0.25* 0.01 0.25* 0.41** 
Note: N = 82 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
a Natural log of the variables 
 
Table 3 (continued) 
 
 8 9 10 11 12 
9 0.21     
10 -0.22 -0.03    
11 0.10 0.07 0.31**   
12 0.16 -0.05 0.00 0.01  
13 0.58** 0.09 -0.09 -0.08 0.17 
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Appendix 4 
 
Table 4: Results of Regression Analyses 
 
       
 Devolution of HRM Network Building Subsidiary Growth 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Localization Strategies       
Devolution of HRM      0.39** 
      (0.14) 
Network Building      0.24* 
      (0.11) 
       
Institutional Pressures       
Host: Regulatory 
Pressures 
 -0.05  0.16* 0.02 0.02 
  (0.05)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
Home: State Ownership  -0.07+  -0.15* -0.04 0.03 
  (0.04)  (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
       
Control Variables       
Energy Industry -0.48* -0.45* 0.04 0.05 -0.34 -0.20 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.30) (0.28) (0.26) (0.25) 
Financial Industry -0.12 -0.17 0.18 0.04 -0.04 -0.06 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.29) (0.28) (0.26) (0.26) 
Year of entry into US a 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.10 -0.36** -0.37** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) 
Size of the parent firm a 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Number of foreign 
operations a 
-0.18 -0.04 0.06 0.19 0.13 0.08 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.18) (0.19) (0.17) (0.17) 
Ownership structure -0.20 -0.26 -0.72* -0.63* -0.38 0.10 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.33) (0.31) (0.29) (0.32) 
Asset seeking 0.02 0.02 0.16+ 0.15+ -0.04 -0.07 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
Market Expansion 0.20* 0.17* 0.07 0.01 0.04 -0.02 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) 
       
R2 0.25 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.24 0.31 
Note: N = 82 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
a Natural log of the variables 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
